All posts by ashleygood

Seeing Is Believing?

Failure

Okay – I’m willing to put something out here because this is an interesting blog. I believe in learning from mistakes but I’d also warn that not everyone can disclose the mistakes they’ve made!

In the mid-1990s I studied the gender dynamics of rural women’s groups in western Kenya. NGOs, donors and generally outsiders were certainly preoccupied with women’s groups.

Learning

I found that careful understanding of the role of men in women’s groups was warranted. Just as development made women invisible, it also erased men even when they were active in so-called “women’s groups”. See the story in Francis Cleaver (2000) Masculinity Matters. Zed Books. Or contact me for a copy.

Stop Being Clever

Failure

I was starting up a disaster risk reduction program in the rift valley in Ethiopia in 1988. The Derg military “Albanian Marxist” style government was still in place. The local government controlled women’s association asked us to help with buying a small grain mill for them, to cut down hand grinding, or paying extortionate prices to the local mill owner to grind their grain. At the time, when I ran the numbers, I thought this was a marginally useful investment. It would have a hard time making a profit and would not really save the women that much cash or labor.
Btu, when the military regime fell and looting was wide spread across the area, the women took it in turns to mount a 24 hour guard on their mill, forming a cordon around it and safeguarding it.

Learning

The true value of the mill was not financial but through the sense of empowerment and hope if bestowed.
The lesson: Start by dropping your own preconceptions and try to see things though the eyes of those you seek to assist. Taking the time to listen and understand rather than being enamored with one’s own cleverness is a good starting point.

Cotton Industry Failure and Efficiency

Failure

The Zambian cotton industry was going great by most accounts at the start of the PROFIT project.  PROFIT was a USAID funded project that was designed to foster increased competitiveness in the agricultural sector leading to increased poverty reduction.  During the early stages of the project it was assessed and agreed to that the cotton industry provided an excellent opportunity to build upon the success at the time of multiple years of growth according to many economic and donor analyses.

As the project conducted its own analysis to confirm early desk studies it saw a very different picture.  It saw stagnant yields, increasing competition between processers based on win-lose outcomes, and increasing distrust between all players in the value chain.  It also saw very few benefits accruing to farmers or firms in the system, including an unhealthy concentration of risk at the processer level.  The growth had been narrowly defined by overall production and number of farmers getting input via a processer.  The project also identified that farmers did not feel the land or cotton was theirs – they got free inputs, they worked a bit on the land resulting in limited yields, then gave the cotton back to the company for a very small amount of money – they were simply selling their labour because they had no other options.

Faced with this conclusion that ran counter to the overwhelming perspective in the industry that things were great, the project decided to meet with various processors to offer assistance in restructuring the way they did business to specifically improve performance on farmer yields and overall profitability.  As you would guess, the project’s attempts to engage the industry failed except for some support to train farmers – mostly on things they had been trained on before and did not adopt.

The conditions that had allowed the Zambian cotton industry to continue growth despite high inefficiency eroded from 2006 onwards.  Specifically, cotton prices were trending downwards, options for farmers to sell their labour was increasing, the local currency was appreciating rapidly, and levels of risk at the processer level left very little room for error.  Within a short period of time cotton processers, who had stopped engaging with the project came back to ask if the project could re-engage.

The project then worked with a range of processing firms to get them to shift the way they managed farmer-suppliers in order to reduce risks to supply by investing primarily in the better farmers.  While the project had some success in getting firms to improve the way they manage their supply chains resulting in improved relationships between farmers and processors, the project failed to keep the industry from entering a period of distress.  From a peak of upwards of six firms, there are only a few that survive today.    Today though, the firms that are functioning are much better at understanding how to learn and how to manage failure by focusing on key measures like productivity and win-win outcomes so that when failure does come they can learn quickly and adjust effectively.

Learning

So while it is true that from one perspective the project was a failure in that its interventions did not stop the downturn and the cotton industry is much smaller, the project seems to have fostered a stronger systemic foundation. The remaining value chain system relationships have become more effective (win-win) and through their improvements have fostered new services (i.e., spraying and land preparation) to evolve in the rural areas.  Yields have increased and the farmers that remain seem more focused on being cotton farmers as opposed to labourers.  In the end the real success or failure of the project will be if the cotton sector continues to fail in order to learn and learn how to fail effectively.

Fast Forward Café Failure

Failure

We started a project in 2008 where NEDA (Nurture : Educate : Develop : Affirm)  would accept Enterprise Development funds from private companies on behalf of qualified, disenfranchised beneficiaries.  IFC (Innovative Franchise Concepts) then used the money to help beneficiaries buy, start and maintain their own Franchise Business.

Our first project was Fast Forward Cafe, which was aimed at upgrading Street Traders in Johannesburg, South Africa.
We were awarded a tender and signed an MOU with Metro Trading Co. in Johannesburg to start the project. Unfortunately the government organisation changed their minds and denied us the permissions they had already granted us, to place the Fast Forward Cafe mobile units on street corners and at Public Transport stations.

We also had issues with beneficiaries who had a spirit of expectation.  Some beneficiaries took their huge profits and went on holiday leaving their staff unpaid, others hired illegal immigrants and paid them disgusting rates per week.

Mainly due to the inability to place our units on Viable Commuter Routes, we had to shut down the project in 2010.  It was heartbreaking to watch this happen after 3 years, 3 people’s time and 3 million rand had been invested in the project.

Learning

We recently moved to Ballito, North Coast Kwazulu natal, South Africa and our dream has been revived.  We realised that we should have started the project closer to the grass roots, on the ground and amongst the people trying to make a living near their hometown.

This small town of Ballito on the Dolphin Coast and it’s great people have been very receptive to the idea and our plans; it’s inspiring.

We are hosting an event, the North Coast Festival from 6-8 Jan 2012 to raise funds and re-start this project.  We are starting with the leasing of a smallholding opposite a train station, near the communities, where we can setup our distribution centre.

Your talk and website have inspired me. I think we’re on track to making our Empowerment projects, a reality!

Indonesia Microcredit Failure

Failure

I started my microcredit operation in Indonesia in February 2008. Around mid-2009 the business grew to larger than 400 members and the repayment rate was above 90%. We gave $100-200 loans to small business owners.

The plan to grow larger too soon backfired. My staff in Indonesia and I did not select small business clients carefully. I was in Indonesia in 2010 and found that our clients borrowed money without careful business planning. Their businesses were having difficulties soon after getting the microloans. Some used the money for consumption.

The 90% repayment rate dropped to 50% in 2010. We are still struggling now to bring the repayment to a sustainable level.

I decided to increase the interest rate to make the microloans not cheap. We found that the clients took us for granted. They used the microloans to pay loan sharks. Our “cheap” money was not treated as a valuable resource. A totally unexpected outcome from what I thought initially.

Landmine Detector Project Lessons Learned

Failure

Confronting failure is tough. There’s a tendency to bury failure and hide it. In the for-profit sector, failure tends to be pretty obvious. You know how well an investment firm is doing because they have to publish their numbers. A tech company that bombs is quickly recognized as such. The social sector is well known for being risk averse, and this creates incentives to only discuss successes (or to portray borderline or failing efforts as successful).

I believe that we need to embrace failure. Better to have failed boldly on occasion to have never dared at all. The world’s problems are too big and important to be addressed solely with timid measures.

Earlier this year, I and the leadership of our humanitarian Landmine Detector Program made the decision to put the project on ice. Ted Driscoll, a noted serial entrepreneur now turned venture capitalist, had been working to create an affordable humanitarian landmine detector from military-funded explosives detection technology. We did some great market research about real-world challenges facing deminers, and published an extensive report on what we found.

However, we went almost two years believing that we would have access to this technology imminently. Finally, we had to confront the fact that it wasn’t going to happen anytime soon. In the six months since we put this on the back burner, we still haven’t received access to the technology.

Learning

With the support of our largest funder of the project, the Lemelson Foundation, we decided to document the lessons we learned from this experience, in an essay. I was very pleased about Lemelson’s willingness to both knowingly bet on our riskiest project and be open to distributing our post mortem.

It would be tempting to come up with a single reason that this didn’t work out. But it isn’t that simple. Read the essay if you want to know more.

Microcredit in South Africa

Failure

I am an independent microcredit practitioner, and go where I’m asked by an organisation on the ground to train a local person to run a programme. A few years ago I was asked by an English county council twinned with Eastern Cape to start up a programme as part of a big capacity-building project with a particular municipality, funded by the Commonwealth local government good practice scheme. The woman chosen to run it was exceptional, we had a wonderful external evaluation, and some 500 women joined the scheme. It went well for a time until the municipality director changed, and political jealousies entered into the equation. The worker was forbidden to go out into the villages, and so could not collect the money.
One of the main problems was the extreme distance between the villages we were working in; the municipality had promised to provide transport (there is no public transport to some areas), but even at the beginning was unreliable. Hitch hiking was OK but not for great distances as it was impossible to promise to be there on time. We could not be unreliable when asking for discipline from our clients.

Learning

The programme has ceased. We have taken it away from the municipality and it is now under the umbrella of an NGO. The worker is passionate about the programme, and is still in touch with many of the women, but fundraising to start again is tough, because we are viewed as having failed. I never wanted to work with local government!

I Thought I Was Doing a Good Thing

Failure

Several years ago I found an Ayurveda herbalist who lives in a rural village in India. I was looking online for an herbal treatment for one of my patient’s son who had been suffering with severe constipation for 5 years.

This Ayurveda practitioner told me to have the boy drink a cup of warm milk with a tablespoon of ghee each night before bed. It worked like a miracle. I started suggesting other American and European mothers email her for help for their kids. They did and were very happy with her suggestions.

Then I suggested she start an online practice so that she could get paid for her work with these people. I am a Chinese herbalist specializing in helping women get pregnant and the women find me on the internet and live all over the world. I have made a good living like this and knew that she could too. She needed money and was thrilled with the suggestion.

I used all my knowledge of how to create a successful online practice. I created and promote a website for her. I told her what should go into the email correspondences between the mothers and her. I told her how much to charge and how to ask for payment. I felt very excited and proud of myself for helping her increase her income. I went to India to teach her everything she needed to know about maintaining the website and the online practice.

When I got there I found out what a failure it was. The doctor loved the website but she said she felt like a fraud and couldn’t use it. She thought the site looked “American”. She thought the website gave the impression that she was more impressive than she felt. She didn’t have the confidence to use the website even though she had written all the text. She also didn’t feel comfortable asking a reasonable “Western” fee even though I gave her a script to use when asking and when she used the script she got paid.  She felt more comfortable plodding along promoting her work on the web in a way that didn’t bring her the income she needed and probably never would.

Learning

The failure came from me not taking HER personality or cultural expectations into consideration. I had my American “let’s make this venture produce $$” attitude and never thought about her reality.

Ed Fail: Lessons in Building a Nursery

Failure

Yep, no sooner do I post on failure and how we account for it and learn from it, then I come upon a big fail of my own.  That I can learn from. Irony, anyone?

As many of you know, I have been working in Ghana since 1997.  I’ve spent some 20 months there, though it has been a while since I was last on the ground (I need to change that) – basically, the last meaningful research trip I took was in the summer of 2006.  That work, along with the fieldwork that came before it, was so rich that I am still working through what it all means – and it has led me down the path of a book about why development doesn’t work as we expect, and now a (much more academic) complete rethinking of the livelihoods framework that many in development use to assess how people make a living.

One of my big findings (at least according to some of my more senior colleagues) is that inequality and (depending on how you look at it) injustice are not accidental products of “bad information” or “false consciousness” in livelihoods strategies, but integral parts of how people make a living (article to this effect here, with related work here and here, as well as a long discussion in Delivering Development).  One constraint specific to the livelihoods in the villages in which I have been working is the need to balance the material needs of the household with the social requirement that men make more money than their wives.  I have rich empirical data demonstrating this to be true, and illustrating how it plays out in agricultural practice (which makes up about 65% of most household incomes).

In other words, I know damn well that men get very itchy about anything that allows women to become more productive, as this calls one of the two goals of existing livelihoods strategies into question.  Granted, I figured this out for the first time around 2007, and have only very recently (i.e. articles in review) been able to get at this systematically, but still, I knew this.

And I completely overlooked it when trying to implement the one village improvement project with which I have been involved.  Yep, I totally failed to apply my own lessons to myself.

What happened?  Well, to put it simply, I had some money available after the 2006 fieldwork for a village improvement project, which I wanted the residents of Dominase and Ponkrum to identify and, to the extent possible, design for themselves.  We had several community meetings that meandered (as they do) and generally seemed to reflect the dominant voices of men.  However, at the end of one of these meetings, one of my extraordinarily talented Ghanaian colleagues from the University of Cape Coast had the experience and the awareness to quietly wander off to a group of women and chat with them.  I noticed this but did not say anything.  A few minutes later, he strolled by, and as he did he said to me “we need to build a nursery.”  Kofi had managed to elicit the womens’ childcare needs, which were much more practical and actionable than any other plans we had heard.  At the next community meeting we raised this, and nobody objected – we just got into wrangling over details.  I left at the end of the field season, confident we could get this nursery built and staffed.

Learning

Five years later, nothing has happened.  They formed the earth blocks, but nobody cleared the agreed-upon area for the nursery.  It was never a question of money, and my colleagues at the University of Cape Coast checked in regularly.  Each time, they left with promises that something would get going, and nothing ever did.  I don’t fault the UCC team – the community needed to mobilize some labor so they would have buy-in for the project, and would take responsibility for the long-term maintenance of the structure. This is on the community – they just never built it.

And it wasn’t until yesterday, when talking about this with a colleague, that I suddenly realized why – childcare would lessen one demand on women that limits their agricultural productivity and incomes.  Thus, with a nursery in place women’s incomes would surely rise . . . and men have no interest in that, as this is not the sort of intervention that would drive a parallel increase in their own incomes.  I have very robust data that demonstrates that men move to control any increase in their wives incomes that might threaten the social order of the household, even if that decreases overall household income and access to food.

So why, oh why, did I ever think that men would allow this nursery to be built?  Of course they wouldn’t.

I can excuse myself between 2006-2008 for missing this, as I was still working through what was going on in these livelihoods.  But for the last three years I knew about this fundamental component of livelihoods, and how robust this aspect of livelihoods decision-making really is, even under conditions of change such as road construction.  I have been looking at how others misinterpret livelihoods and design/implement bad interventions for years, all the while doing that very thing myself.

Healer, heal thyself.

Failure Report 1.0

We’re rolling out Failure Reports at PDT. I began drafting the guidelines for staff to draft their contributions, and then stopped and decided failure starts at the top. Therefore, before asking them to write something, I opted to get the ball rolling myself.  I made a list of what PDT’s doing wrong as viewed from the 30,000′ level and I shared it with Jennifer (our Deputy Director) and a few of the managers who added some more items. Then I sent the letter below to the PDT team.  Our next reports will be more focused on operational problems with a strong focus on proposed solutions. But, it’s a start.

CulturalRevolution.StruggleSession

Failure Report 1.0

Dear Colleagues:

As I wrote earlier this month, PDT will be issuing an organization-wide failure report early next year along the lines of those provided by Engineers Without Borders.  We are still refining the guidelines.  Inspired by Cornell West, who asked “Yes it’s failure, but how good a failure?, we want a template that focuses on learning from these mistakes. So, in the spirit of failing well, I’ve chosen to draft our first report from the perspective of PDT’s management.

Please note this important disclaimer: The failures listed in this report don’t belong to the PDT staff. They belong to me and Jennifer and the rest of the leadership at HQ.  Our people in the field do amazing work under difficult and often dangerous conditions.  Each of the shortcomings listed is due to decisions or direction that came from the people at the top of the org chart.

  1. Our biggest accolades come for our Peace Dividend Marketplace projects that have redirected over $600m into the economies of Afghanistan, Haiti, and Timor. There are two problems with this. First, we really don’t know how much of that would have been spent in the local economies without our intervention. In some cases, we have not redirected, but accelerated international spending. For example, the donors would have spent several months trying to find a local vendor, but we helped them find it in a couple of weeks. Both outcomes are economically beneficial, but without being able to accurately distinguish the two it is very hard to measure the actual impact of these projects. This isn’t good enough.  Going forward, we need to implement a new component to our results tracking systems that also looks at the nature of the contracts being tendered.
  2. The second problem with our Marketplace projects is that we track the gross economic impact of foreign spending, instead of the net impact. As you all know, $1m of donor money spent buying Chinese desks from a Kabul vendor is not the same as $1m spent in Helmand buying vegetables from a local farmer. Frankly, the latter will probably have a bigger economic impact than the former. It will create more jobs, and possibly even greater tax revenue and GDP growth. But we don’t have a grip on how to accurately analyze the direct effects of increased local spending, and the gross dollar figure approach is too crude. It distorts how we measure the true economic benefit of our activities, and it leads to prioritizing large dollar value spending that may have very low local benefit, and it entirely ignores job creation. Furthermore, we definitely can’t predict impact in advance that would allow us to efficiently focus the project activities.  We need to be far better at this. With the expansion of our Economist team, Jennifer and I have asked that we develop a methodology for this analysis and that it be rolled out across our various country programs.
  3. Related to 1 & 2 above, we don’t do nearly enough impact measurement. It would be easy to blame the donors here, since for the most part they only care that we measure process: Budget performance, number of training sessions held, etc. But PDT believes passionately in enhancing impact through better data. We need to focus more of our resources on this. If we did, we could show that some of our projects are indeed producing remarkable results in terms of poverty reduction or job creation, but that others are simply not worth the effort (and then cut those projects to work elsewhere.)  For new projects, we will write into the contribution agreements impact measurement activities and clauses to ensure that the project will be primarily judged on those metrics.
  4. Perhaps one of our biggest failures is our fundraising strategy. We have grown far too dependent on government donor agencies. This has slowed us down and made us more process driven.  Our “unrestricted funding”, the money we can spend on finding and testing new ideas, is tiny. We should have been focusing on this far more, far earlier. With all the good press we’ve gotten, I should have been working far harder on turning that into financial support. In reality, we only started looking for private funders in the last 12 months! In the first quarter of 2011 we will be hiring a Development Director who will work directly with me to review and overhaul our funding strategy and activities.
  5. We’ve ignored the lessons learned by others. A lot of the “new ideas” that PDT develops aren’t actually new. Someone else in the aid industry thought of it before and tried it elsewhere. We need to put far more energy into ferreting this out. It will allow us to a) give credit where credit is due, b) focus our precious resources on genuinely new ideas, and c) build on the experience of others to fine tune or further innovate these concepts.  How can we fix this? Partly we need to be more curious and more energetic in our research.  Jennifer and I may also put up a big sign in the New York bullpen that reads “Great idea. Now find out who thought of it first.”
  6. We have wasted far too much time (and readily available donor money), measuring the “economic impact of aid”. That work was important and useful and groundbreaking 5 years ago when the Economic Impact of Peacekeeping initiative showed that only a small fraction of international spending was going into the local economy. But now, it’s not new. It’s not surprising. And it’s very safe to extrapolate the data collected in Liberia in 2007 to estimate the donor footprint in country x in 2010. But the donors keep offering to pay for another study, so we keep doing it. We need to stop. Aid is rarely made more effective by the production of yet another study.  We’ve already cut some of these projects out of our pipeline. Going forward, we will ensure that new economic analysis projects clearly move the research forward in obvious ways.
  7. Our staffing systems are really lagging. To be fair, we’ve doubled in size almost every year over the last 6 years. This creates strains on our administrative processes. But still, if we want to keep our good people, and find more people like them, we need to be faster, smarter, and better on how we look after the PDT team. (This isn’t the fault of our HR team. They’ve been crying for more resources to do this, and I promise I’ll find them!) In the new year we will look at some new support structures for field teams and budget for additional resources in the HR unit.
  8. PDT’s communications efforts are terrible, I mean truly painfully awful. Have you seen our website? Or noticed that we have multiple websites? Our print material is even worse. We’ve spent so much time focused on the “doing” senior leadership (i.e. me) has totally forgotten about the “telling and advocating”.  Our project staff are understandably frustrated by this, and even more frustrated because we keep promising to fix this.  They need not only a plan, but a clear message, and assistance from HQ on how to deliver it.  The fix for this can’t be summarized in a sentence. Early in the new year our new Communications Director will be circulating a detailed plan for not just fixing this problem but for implementing an aggressively innovative new approach for comms.
  9. We are too quick to criticize others. For example, just yesterday I took a cheap shot at Bob Geldoff in a newspaper interview (sorry Bob, we love you). I agree that some folks in the aid industry deserve all the criticism we can shovel on them. But in more cases there are complex and intractable reasons why projects, NGOs, and donors behave the way they do. We need recognize this, and be far less eager to blame the entities, but rather we should blame the industry wide conditions and norms that not only tolerate failure, but in some cases encourage it.  To be frank, I’m not sure if we’re going to get better at this. But, perhaps, if we are quick to criticize ourselves it won’t seem quite so bad.
  10. Unbelievably, we have almost no Knowledge Management system. We have a shared intranet, where important documents are stored, but nothing that actually functions well. While we rail about the importance of the aid industry and the UN capturing what Donald Rumsfeld called the “known knowns”, we have failed to systematically capture our own knowledge. This makes it especially hard on our project staff who often are forced to “figure it out” without the benefit of knowing that another PDT staffer did exactly that, in the same project, 2 years earlier. Jennifer and I will be talking to you, our IT team, and others to first determine the scope of our needs, and then to propose some solutions.
  11. Related to the previous failure, PDT has been embarrassingly hypocritical in demanding reforms in the aid industry that we haven’t implemented ourselves. Here are just two examples. We’ve argued for years that the aid industry should bring in performance bonuses to reward excellence and encourage innovation. We also have tried to convince the UN to offer more staff recognition awards to highlight the best practices of their field staff. But in both cases, PDT has planned but failed to roll out similar programs internally. And refer back to items 1 through 3 above. We demand more data and analysis, but we don’t do enough of it ourselves.  How do we fix this? By being more self-aware. By reminding ourselves that as we grow, we will draw the same scrutiny we apply to others. And by using that scrutiny as an opportunity to not only advocate for innovation, but also demonstrate innovation.

We welcome your comments and look forward to working with you to fix these failures in the year ahead.

Sincerely,
Scott